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Religious Liberties
Why the Supreme Court Has Fashioned Rules of Standing
Unique to the Establishment Clause
By Carl H. Esbeck*

T

he U.S. Supreme Court is quite vigilant in enforcing
its justiciability rules concerning standing to sue. For
over half a century, however, the Supreme Court has
reduced the rigor of its standing rules when a claim is lodged
under the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.
The Court famously did so with respect to federal taxpayer
standing in the venerable case of Flast v. Cohen,1 but in no
instance other than claims invoking the Establishment Clause
is federal or state taxpayer standing ever permitted.2 Less well
known is the reduced rigor with which the Court has applied
its standing rules when it comes to a plaintiﬀ’s “unwanted
exposure” to a religious symbol or other speech attributable to
the government.
The Roberts Court narrowly construed its prior cases
permitting taxpayer standing to challenge government payments
for religious purposes in Hein v. Freedom From Religion
Foundation, Inc.3 Recently the Court granted certiorari in
Salazar v. Buono,4 a case which raises the question of the standing
required of a plaintiﬀ in an “unwanted exposure” lawsuit that
seeks the removal of a Latin cross on federal property because
it is alleged to be in violation of the Establishment Clause.
The Supreme Court’s cases on “unwanted exposure” do
not require religious coercion or other individualized harm as
plaintiﬀ’s “injury in fact.” Rather, the cases evince a willingness
to ﬁnd standing when a plaintiﬀ’s status naturally results in him
or her being personally exposed to the government’s unwanted
religious expression or the plaintiﬀ is forced to assume a special
burden to avoid such exposure. The plaintiﬀ in Salazar v. Buono
lacks that status and, hence, will not likely be found to have
standing unless the Court extends its precedents.
I. Statement of the Case
In 1934, the Veterans of Foreign Wars erected a Latin
cross on a location known as Sunrise Rock in the Mojave
Desert in southeastern California.5 This was unauthorized by
the federal government, which owned the property. The cross is
a memorial to members of the armed forces who died in World
War I. In 1994, the site where the cross is located became part
of the Mojave National Preserve, which is administered by the
National Park Service, Department of the Interior. The Mojave
National Preserve consists of 1.6 million acres of federal land
in the Mojave Desert of southeastern California.
The respondent, Frank Buono, ﬁled this lawsuit in March
2001, seeking a declaration that the Latin cross on government
land violated the Establishment Clause, as well as an injunction
ordering the permanent removal of the cross. At the time suit
was ﬁled, Buono was a retired employee of the National Park
Service residing in Oregon. He retired twelve years ago in
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1997. When Buono was still employed by the Park Service, he
was assigned to the Mojave Preserve from January 22, 1995
to December 10, 1995. It was during this period that Buono
learned of the Latin cross and visited the site at Sunrise Rock.
Buono ﬁrst became troubled when there was a request to
erect a Buddhist stupa6 near the cross. When the request was
denied, Buono believed it was wrong for the cross to remain
while similar access was denied for the stupa. His objections
later evolved and expanded. Although retired, Buono retains
an active interest in the Mojave National Preserve and visits the
Preserve two to four times per year.
Buono is a Roman Catholic and testiﬁed that he does not
ﬁnd a Latin cross religiously oﬀensive. Rather, he is oﬀended
because the cross remains at Sunrise Rock but similar access
is denied to displays such as the Buddhist stupa, and because
the National Park Service fails to remove the cross, a symbol of
Christianity, from government land. When visiting the Mojave
National Preserve, Buono has taken to avoiding Sunrise Rock
so as not to be re-exposed to the cross, such avoidance being an
added burden because it means not using Cima Road. One can
see the Latin cross from the highway where Cima Road passes
by Sunrise Rock. Cima Road is the most convenient road for
accessing other areas of interest within the Preserve.
The Supreme Court has developed a three-part requirement
for standing to sue. The plaintiﬀ must have suﬀered, or is
immediately threatened with, a speciﬁc “injury in fact.” There
must be a causal link between the defendant’s conduct and
plaintiﬀ’s injury. And the plaintiﬀ seeks a remedy of a type
traditionally rendered by our courts of law or equity.
The lower federal courts held that Buono has personalized
“injury in fact” such that he has standing to bring this claim
alleging a continuing violation of the Establishment Clause.
The federal district court wrote as follows:
Buono is deeply oﬀended by the cross display on public land in
an area that is not open to others to put up whatever symbols
they choose. A practicing Roman Catholic, Buono does not ﬁnd
the cross itself objectionable, but stated that the presence of the
cross is objectionable to him as a religious symbol because it rests
on federal land.7

First quoting with approval this passage by the district court,
as well as taking note of Buono’s avoidance of Cima Road, the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals went on to observe that:
Buono is, in other words, unable to “freely us[e]” the area of
the Preserve around the cross because of the government’s
allegedly unconstitutional actions…. We have repeatedly held
that inability to unreservedly use public land suﬃces as injuryin-fact.... Such inhibition constitutes “personal injury suﬀered...
as a consequence of the alleged constitutional error,” beyond
simply “the psychological consequence presumably produced by
observation of conduct with which one disagrees.”8
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Given Buono’s testimony that as a Catholic he suﬀers no
religious oﬀense because of the cross, spiritual injury cannot
be a basis for “unwanted exposure” standing. That leaves two
other possibilities: (1) oﬀense because others cannot erect their
symbols near where the cross is located; or (2) oﬀense that the
cross, a Christian symbol, stands on government property in
violation of the separation of church and state. From the Ninth
Circuit’s statement quoted above, the circuit court—while
noting both oﬀensives as Buono’s claimed “injury in fact”—is
relying principally on Buono’s “unwanted exposure” to the
continued presence of a Latin cross on government property.
Moreover, notes the circuit panel, Buono found this oﬀense
suﬃciently weighty that he has taken to avoiding Cima Road
and thereby incurring additional travel burdens as he explores
the Mojave National Preserve.
Buono lacks third-party standing to complain that others
are denied access to Sunrise Rock so that they might erect their
own symbols.9 Thus, Buono’s oﬀense that others are denied
their rights is a claim of “injury in fact” for the Buddhists who
sought to erect a stupa some years back.10
The plaintiﬀ’s other claim of “injury in fact” is a bit more
involved. Buono seeks only injunctive relief from an ongoing
injury. He does not seek damages. That leaves Buono’s alleged
ongoing “injury in fact” as being either: (1) unwanted exposure
to the cross because of the government’s failure to meet its duty
of church-state separation which requires, in his view, removal
of the cross from government land; or (2) restricted use of Cima
Road to avoid being re-exposed every time he observes the
government’s failure to remove the cross. The ﬁrst allegation,
however, is a claim of “injury in fact” when a strict separationist
is oﬀended by a church-state violation while observing a
religious symbol on government land. That is like the claimed
“injury” discussed and rejected in Valley Forge Christian College
v. Americans United.11 And the second allegation of “injury in
fact” is one of restricted use of Cima Road because of Buono’s
oﬀense that the government has failed to remove the cross. Thus
the second alleged harm (avoiding oﬀense) logically collapses
into the ﬁrst (being oﬀended).
With respect to the alleged church-state violation observed
by Respondents, Americans United for Separation of Church
and State, Inc., et al., the Valley Forge Court held:
Although respondents claim that the Constitution has been
violated, they claim nothing else. They fail to identify any
personal injury suﬀered by them as a consequence of the alleged
constitutional error, other than the psychological consequence
presumably produced by observation of conduct with which one
disagrees.... It is evident that respondents are ﬁrmly committed to
the constitutional principle of separation of church and State, but
standing is not measured by the intensity of the litigant’s interest
or the fervor of his advocacy.12

Buono tries to circumvent this passage in Valley Forge by
asserting he suﬀers a personal injury in that he does not use
Cima Road to avoid re-exposure to the Latin cross.
That is not enough for Buono to secure standing, as the
Valley Forge Court went on to explain. The Court distinguished
the facts before it in Valley Forge from that of the parents and
school-age children exposed to unwanted prayer and devotional
Bible reading in Abington School District v. Schempp:13
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“The parties [in Schempp] are school children and their parents,
who are directly aﬀected by the laws and practices against which
their complaints are directed.” ... The plaintiﬀs in Schempp had
standing, not because their complaint rested on the Establishment
Clause—for as Doremus [v. Board of Education, 342 U.S.
429 (1952),] demonstrated, that is insuﬃcient—but because
impressionable schoolchildren were subject to unwelcome
religious exercises or were forced to assume special burdens
to avoid them. [Americans United, et al.] have alleged no
comparable injury.14

The Supreme Court’s “unwanted exposure” precedents require
that a plaintiﬀ’s status naturally result in being personally
exposed to oﬀensive religious expression by the government
or forced to assume special burdens to avoid such exposure.
In Schempp, the claimants’ natural circumstance of public
school attendance was such that the students were brought
into personal exposure to the unwelcomed prayer and biblical
devotions or forced to assume special burdens to avoid them.
This sensible rule has developed to prevent standing by
contrivance. Requiring “injury” so as to have standing to sue
can easily be manufactured if all one has to do is travel several
miles to the site of a religious symbol or other expression of the
government’s and personally observe it on one occasion. Thus,
it makes sense that a plaintiﬀ’s status (e.g., student, legislator,
local municipal citizen) must naturally bring him or her into
personal contact with the oﬀending expression.
Buono’s ongoing claim is that he will suﬀer an oﬀense
cognizable under the Establishment Clause if he travels to
observe the cross which he deems a church-state violation, or he
is “forced to assume special burdens to avoid” being re-exposed
to the church-state violation. However, Buono’s status does
not naturally subject him to personal exposure to the cross.
Buono’s request for injunctive relief means that he necessarily
avers an ongoing violation of the Establishment Clause. But
he is a retired employee of the National Park Service residing
in Oregon. Buono’s visits to the Preserve are totally at his own
free will. It is not as if Buono is currently employed by the Park
Service and his job duties require that, from time to time, he
travel Cima Road past Sunrise Rock. Buono’s path to standing
is foreclosed by Valley Forge, as well as that Court’s reliance on
Schempp and Doremus.
II. In Cases Raising “Unwanted Exposure” to
Religious Expression Attributable to the
Government, Reduced-Rigor Standing Has Been
Permitted Only Where the Plaintiff ’s Status
Naturally Results In Personal Exposure to the
Unwanted Religious Expression
There is a very close connection between “injury in fact”
for purposes of standing and damages (or “harm”) as a necessary
element of every claim under the Establishment Clause and for
which plaintiﬀ seeks a remedy. Indeed, they usually have been
treated as one and the same by the Supreme Court. Therefore,
the standing question in this case puts at issue a crucial element
for stating a claim under the Court’s modern Establishment
Clause.
As with taxpayer standing (discussed Part III, infra),
the Supreme Court’s “unwanted exposure” cases under the
Establishment Clause have resulted in reduced-rigor rules with
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respect to the “injury in fact” required for standing. However,
this reduction in the rigor with which “injury” is assessed is
a narrow exception15—same as it is with taxpayer standing.16
Reduced rigor in the required “injury” has been permitted
only in cases challenging religious symbols or other expression
attributable to the government. And only then does the lesser
“injury” suﬃce where the plaintiﬀ’s status naturally results
in personal exposure to the unwanted religious expression,
or the plaintiﬀ is forced to assume a special burden to avoid
re-exposure.
The Supreme Court’s cases of “unwanted exposure” to
government religious speech are not great in number—just
sixteen. Moreover, in nearly all of these cases—just three
exceptions—the plaintiﬀ’s standing was not challenged on
appeal by the government and thus was not an issue argued by
counsel and decided by the Court. This second line of cases,
therefore, have less to teach us with respect to what the Court
minimally requires to have the “injury in fact” required for
standing to bring a case of “unwanted exposure” to religious
speech by the government. In chronological order the cases
are as follows:
1. McCollum v. Board of Education17 invalidated a local school
district’s program allowing nearby churches to hold optional
religion classes in public school classrooms during regular school
hours. The plaintiﬀ was a resident and taxpayer of the local
school district, and “a parent whose child was then enrolled
in the Champaign public schools.”18 Also relevant to plaintiﬀ’s
subjection to the program to have standing to challenge it, the
Court said:
The operation of the State’s compulsory education system thus
assists and is integrated with the program of religious instruction
carried on by separate religious sects. Pupils compelled by law
to go to school for secular education are released in part from
their legal duty upon the condition that they attend the religious
classes.19

The government’s challenge to plaintiﬀ’s standing was rejected
without analysis in a single sentence: “A second ground for
the motion to dismiss is that the appellant lacks standing to
maintain the action, a ground which is also without merit.
Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 443, 445, 464.”20 (Coleman
addressed the jurisdiction of the Court to review actions by
state legislators said to have ratiﬁed a proposed amendment
to the federal Constitution.) Accordingly, we do not have an
explanation by the Court with respect to what “injury in fact”
is required to ﬁle a case of “unwanted exposure” to religious
expression by the government.
2. Doremus v. Board of Education21 challenged teacher-led
devotional Bible reading in New Jersey public schools. However,
the Court did not reach the merits. Some plaintiﬀs, claiming
status as state taxpayers, were dismissed for lack of standing.
And a parent of a student subjected to the religious exercise had
sued, but his child had subsequently graduated and thus his
claim was moot. Accordingly, the case is not an instance where
the Court ruled on the “injury in fact,” required of a plaintiﬀ
claiming “unwanted exposure” to religious speech attributable
to the government.
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3. Engel v. Vitale22 was a challenge to a statewide program of
daily classroom prayer in New York public schools. The plaintiﬀs
were “parents of ten pupils... insisting that use of this oﬃcial
prayer in the public schools was contrary to the beliefs, religion,
or religious practices of both themselves and their children.”23
The government did not challenge the standing of the plaintiﬀs.
That is surprising because the objecting parents and their schoolage children could obtain an opt-out from the prayer exercise.24
So once again the case did not present an instance where the
Court determined the “injury in fact” required of a plaintiﬀ
claiming “unwanted exposure” to religious speech attributable
to the government.
The fact that the “observance on the part of the students
is voluntary,” however, did not escape the Court’s notice.25
The prayer being voluntary would make a diﬀerence under the
Free Exercise Clause, explained the Court, where coercion is
an essential element of the prima facie claim. But with respect
to the Establishment Clause, coercion or compulsory exposure
to the prayer need not be shown.26 This is because the object
of the modern Establishment Clause is to separate church and
state so as to prevent injury to either or both, as opposed to
being a rights-based claim with its object being to prohibit
individual religious harm.27 In Part III, infra, it will be shown
how this relates to standing, and thus why the modern Court
has fashioned “reduced rigor” standing rules only under the
Establishment Clause.
4. School District of Abington Township v. Schempp28 involved
consolidated cases from Philadelphia and Baltimore, both
challenging daily classroom prayer and devotional Bible reading
in public schools. In both instances, the religious exercises were
optional.29 In the Philadelphia case, the plaintiﬀs were:
Edward Lewis Schempp, his wife Sidney, and their children,
Roger and Donna… members of the Unitarian Church in
Germantown, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, where they... regularly
attend religious services.... The [two] children attend the
Abington Senior High School, which is a public school operated
by appellant district.30

Also, “Edward Schempp and the children testiﬁed as to speciﬁc
religious doctrines purveyed by a literal reading of the Bible
‘which were contrary to the religious beliefs which they held
and to their familial teaching.’”31
In the Baltimore case, the plaintiﬀs were “Mrs. Madalyn
Murray and her son, William J. Murray III, ... both professed
atheists.”32 The “petition particularized the petitioners’ atheistic
beliefs and stated that the rule, as practiced, violated their rights
‘in that it threatens their religious liberty by placing a premium
on belief as against non-belief and subjects their freedom of
conscience to the rule of the majority....’”33
The lack of plaintiﬀs’ standing to challenge the religious
practices under the Establishment Clause was raised as an issue
by the government.34 The Court reasoned in footnote 9 that
the plaintiﬀs had standing as follows:
[T]he requirements for standing to challenge state action under
the Establishment Clause, unlike those relating to the Free
Exercise Clause, do not include proof that particular religious
freedom are infringed.... The parties here are school children and
their parents, who are directly aﬀected by the laws and practices
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against which their complaints are directed. These interests surely
suﬃce to give the parties standing to complain.

oﬀending prayer takes place is suﬃcient “injury in fact” to have
standing in this “unwanted exposure” case.

Thus, standing under the modern Establishment Clause is not
only diﬀerent, but the need for “injury in fact” is of lesser rigor.
That much is clear. Footnote 9 cites as authority McGowan,
Engel, and Doremus, but as we have seen in none of those cases
did the government challenge the plaintiﬀs’ standing to bring
an “unwanted exposure” claim.
As in Engel, the Schempp Court explained its lack of
concern that plaintiﬀs did not prove they were victims of
the government’s compulsion or coercion. Coercion is an
element of a Free Exercise Clause claim which is rights-based,
but compulsion is not required to state a claim under the
Establishment Clause.35 This is because the Establishment
Clause is about policing the boundary between church and
state. “[T]he Court found that the ‘ﬁrst and most immediate
purpose [of the Establishment Clause] rested on the belief that a
union of government and religion tends to destroy government
and to degrade religion.’”36 In Part III, infra, it will be shown
how this relates to standing, and thus why the modern Court
has fashioned “reduced rigor” standing rules only under the
Establishment Clause.

8. Lynch v. Donnelly47 upheld a municipal practice of displaying
a nativity scene of Mary, Joseph, and the Christ child as part
of a larger Christmas holiday scene in a park. The display was
located in a private park in the heart of the shopping district.48
The plaintiﬀs were described as Pawtucket, Rhode Island
“residents and individual members of the Rhode Island aﬃliate
of the American Civil Liberties Union, and the aﬃliate itself.”49
The Court’s majority opinion does not discuss standing, thus
it appears the government did not challenge plaintiﬀs’ claimed
“unwanted exposure” injury giving rise to standing.
In a now famous concurring opinion, Justice O’Connor
ﬁrst stated her “endorsement or disapproval test.” Her test
identiﬁes an injury that is personal to certain plaintiﬀs that
the Establishment Clause is said to prevent, namely that the
Establishment Clause “prohibits government from making
adherence to a religion relevant in any way to a person’s standing
in the political community.”50 Justice O’Connor goes on with
what in her view is the nature of the “injury in fact”:

5. Chamberlin v. Dade County Board of Public Instruction,37
citing Schempp, summarily struck down prayer and devotional
Bible reading in the Dade County, Florida public school district.
The plaintiﬀs were parents of school-aged children enrolled in
junior high and elementary schools in Dade County.38 The
plaintiﬀs’ standing to raise an “unwanted exposure” claim was
not challenged by the government in the Supreme Court, and
thus we have no guidance on the needed “injury” from the
Court.
6. Stone v. Graham39 struck down a state law requiring the
posting of the Ten Commandments in all public school
classrooms. Plaintiﬀs described themselves “as a Quaker, a
Unitarian, a non-believer, a mother of school age children and
public school teacher, two children of compulsory school age
attending public schools, a Jewish Rabbi, and as taxpayers.”40
The plaintiﬀs’ standing to raise an “unwanted exposure” claim
was not challenged by the government before the Supreme
Court, and thus we have no guidance on the matter from the
Court.
7. Marsh v. Chambers41 upheld a state legislative practice of hiring
a chaplain to oﬀer a prayer at the beginning of each day when
the legislature is in session. The plaintiﬀ was simply described
as “a member of the Nebraska Legislature and a taxpayer of
Nebraska.”42 The Court also noted that the plaintiﬀ “claiming
injury by the practice is an adult, presumably not readily
susceptible to ‘religious indoctrination,’ or peer pressure.”43
Although the government had challenged the plaintiﬀ’s standing
in the circuit court,44 it did not again press the issue before the
Supreme Court.45 Although conceded by the state, the Supreme
Court nevertheless volunteered the following: “[W]e agree that
Chambers, as a member of the legislature and as a taxpayer
whose taxes are used to fund the chaplaincy, has standing to
assert the claim.”46 Thus a person vested with the status of a
legislator who is regularly in the legislative chamber when the
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One is excessive entanglement with religious institutions, which
may interfere with the independence of the institutions, give
the institutions access to government or governmental powers
not fully shared by nonadherents of the religion, and foster
the creation of political constituencies deﬁned along religious
lines. The second and more direct infringement is government
endorsement or disapproval of religion. Endorsement sends a
message to nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full members
of the political community, and an accompanying message to
adherents that they are insiders, favored members of the political
community. Disapproval sends the opposite message.51

A violation of the endorsement test always results in a plaintiﬀ’s
“religious” injury because the test is contingent on “adherence
[or nonadherence] to a religion.” This “endorsement or
disapproval” test has possibilities for identifying the personal
religious injury that naturally ﬂows from one’s status as local
citizen when the church-state matter at issue is “unwanted
exposure” to a government’s religious expression. But the injury
must be religious, unlike that claimed by Buono. That said, it is
not clear the extent to which a majority of the current Supreme
Court embraces Justice O’Connor’s test. The endorsement test
would limit “unwanted exposure” standing to instances where
there is religious injury. That is contrary to most of the Court’s
array of sixteen “unwanted exposure” cases collected here.
Accordingly, there is no reason to limit “unwanted exposure”
standing to instances of religious injury.
9. Wallace v. Jaﬀree52 struck down a state law requiring that
public schools begin the day with a moment of silence by
students for prayer or meditation. The law was found to have
a religious purpose.53 The plaintiﬀ challenging the law was a
parent who sued on behalf of “three of his minor children; two
of them were second-grade students and the third was then in
kindergarten.”54 Plaintiﬀ’s standing to challenge the state law
was not raised by the government. So once again we do not have
the beneﬁt of the Court’s discussion of what minimal “injury”
is required in an “unwanted exposure” claim.
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10. Edwards v. Aguillard55 struck down a state law requiring
public schools to teach creationism whenever evolution is
taught. The law was found to have a religious purpose.56 The
plaintiﬀs challenging the law “included parents of children
attending Louisiana public schools, Louisiana teachers, and
religious leaders.”57 The Court went on to observe:
Families entrust public schools with the education of their
children, but condition their trust on the understanding that the
classroom will not purposely be used to advance religious views
that may conﬂict with the private beliefs of the student and his or
her family. Students in such institutions are impressionable and
their attendance is involuntary. The State exerts great authority
and coercive power through mandatory attendance requirements,
and because of the students’ emulation of teachers as role models
and the children’s susceptibility to peer pressure.58

Thus the “harm” to plaintiﬀs’ school-age children was the
natural consequences of their status as students in Louisiana
schools.
Once again there was no challenge by the government
before the Supreme Court to plaintiﬀs’ standing to call into
question the state law. So we can only infer the “injury” needed
for standing in a case of “unwanted exposure” to government
religious speech.
11. County of Allegheny v. Greater Pittsburgh ACLU59 involved
challenges to two local governmental displays during the
December holiday season. The Court struck down a nativity
scene inside the county courthouse, and upheld an outdoor
display of a Menorah, Christmas tree, and liberty banner at a
diﬀerent location jointly operated by the city and county. The
plaintiﬀs challenging both displays were “the Greater Pittsburgh
Chapter of the American Civil Liberties Union and seven local
residents” of the city and county.60 Once again the government
did not challenge the plaintiﬀs’ standing before the Court.
12. Lee v. Weisman61 struck down the practice of inviting clergy
to oﬀer prayers at public school commencement ceremonies.
Attendance at the ceremony was voluntary, and no penalty
attached to a student who did not attend.62 The plaintiﬀs
challenging the practice were “Daniel Weisman, in his
individual capacity as a Providence taxpayer and as [father] of
Deborah,” a student now graduated from the middle school, and
enrolled in the high school where a similar prayer arrangement
was conducted at its commencement.63 Plaintiﬀs’ standing was
discussed. The Court said:
We ﬁnd it unnecessary to address Daniel Weisman’s taxpayer
standing, for a live and justiciable controversy is before us.
Deborah Weisman is enrolled as a student at Classical High
School in Providence and from the record it appears likely, if not
certain, that an invocation and benediction will be conducted at
her high school graduation.64

Once again the voluntary nature of the ceremony—hence lack
of compulsion—did not make a diﬀerence so long as the claim
is brought under the Establishment Clause.
13. Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe65 struck down
a public school process whereby a student is elected by fellow
students to oﬀer words of inspiration (with prayer as a likely
choice) over the loudspeaker system before high school football
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games. The plaintiﬀs challenging the practice were “two sets of
current or former students and their respective mothers. One
family is Mormon and the other is Catholic.”66 The government
did not challenge the standing of the plaintiﬀs to bring their
claim under the Establishment Clause.
14. Elk Grove Uniﬁed School District v. Newdow67 concerned
a plaintiﬀ who was denied standing to challenge the words
“under God” in the Pledge of Allegiance recited by public school
students, including his daughter, at the beginning of each school
day. Although the pledge was optional, both the daughter and
her mother, who held legal custody, wished to have the daughter
recite the pledge. Standing was denied because the plaintiﬀ,
although the student’s father, was a noncustodial parent having
no say in the matter. Accordingly, Newdow does not discuss the
“injury in fact” needed for standing by a plaintiﬀ complaining
of “unwanted exposure” to religious expression attributable to
the government.
15. Van Orden v. Perry68 upheld the constitutionality of a Ten
Commandments monument, one of several monuments on
display on the grounds outside the State of Texas Capitol. The
plaintiﬀ challenging the monument was described as follows:
Thomas Van Orden is a native Texan and a resident of Austin.
At one time he was a licensed lawyer, having graduated from
Southern Methodist Law School. Van Orden testiﬁed that, since
1995, he has encountered the Ten Commandments monument
during his frequent visits to the Capitol grounds. His visits are
typically for the purpose of using the law library in the Supreme
Court building, which is located just northwest of the Capitol
building.
Forty years after the monument’s erection and six years after
Van Orden began to encounter the monument frequently, he
sued….69

As one trained as a lawyer but without a law oﬃce or library of
his own, as well as a citizen of Austin, it was natural that he took
advantage of the free use of the law library near the Capitol.
The government did not challenge Van Orden’s standing before
the Court.
16. McCreary County v. ACLU of Kentucky70 struck down the
Ten Commandments placed in display cases, along with other
historical documents, in two county courthouses in the State
of Kentucky. The plaintiﬀs challenging both displays were
all too brieﬂy described as “American Civil Liberties Union
of Kentucky, et al.”71 The Court also explained that in both
counties “the hallway display was ‘readily visible to... county
citizens who use the courthouse to conduct their civic business,
to obtain or renew driver’s licenses and permits, to register
cars, to local taxes, and to register to vote.’”72 A lower court
opinion explains that in addition to the ACLU of Kentucky,
the plaintiﬀs were Lawrence Durham and Paul Lee.73 From the
context it is apparent that Durham and Lee are residents of the
county. The lower court said the ACLU had organizational
standing because it “has members in Pulaski County who
would have standing for the same reason that the named
plaintiﬀs have standing.”74 And the government suggested in
its briefs that “the Ten Commandments were posted in order
to teach Pulaski County residents about American religious
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history and the foundations of the modern state.”75 Although
before the district court the government challenged plaintiﬀs’
standing because they lacked the necessary “injury in fact,”76
having lost the issue at the trial level the government did not
raise the standing question before the Supreme Court. One can
infer from McCreary County that a county citizen who has to
visit the site of the oﬀending religious message in order to do
necessary legal transactions with the county government has the
status and personal “unwanted exposure” so as to have “injury
in fact” for purposes of standing.

I

t is remarkable that in only three out of sixteen cases has
plaintiﬀs’ standing been challenged before the U.S. Supreme
Court on the basis that there was no “injury in fact” due to
“unwanted exposure” to the government’s religious speech. The
three cases are Schempp, Marsh, and Weisman. These three cases
involve plaintiﬀs who are parents and their school-age children,
and a legislator. The rule to draw from Schempp, Marsh, and
Weisman, and to a lesser degree the other thirteen cases where
lack of standing might have been raised but was not, is that the
“injury” required in an “unwanted exposure” case is that the
oﬀended plaintiﬀ’s status in life must have brought him or her
into personal contact with the government’s religious symbol or
other expression.77 Following this rule will prevent parties who
would contrive their exposure “injury” by going out of their way
to travel to the site of a religious symbol and observe it merely
to acquire standing. Buono has no such status such that he has
“injury in fact” endowing him with a “case” or “controversy”
for which he has standing to sue.
III. Why the Court Has Permitted ReducedRigor Standing in Only Two Instances,
Both Involving Claims
under the Establishment Clause
In circumstances very diﬀerent than the one before the
Supreme Court, a claimant under the Establishment Clause can
have individualized “injury in fact” that meets all of the normal
requirements for standing. These harms run from economic
loss, to inability to qualify for public oﬃce, to restrictions on
academic inquiry.78 But in each of the six cases set out in the
footnote, plaintiﬀs had conventional “injury in fact” and thus
met the usual “case” or “controversy” requirements for standing.
That is not so with respect to cases involving “unwanted
exposure” to religious symbols or other speech fairly attributable
to the government. Only in two types of cases—taxpayer and
“unwanted exposure” claims—has the Court applied a reducedrigor test for “injury in fact” so as to ease the path to reaching
the merits of a claim under the Establishment Clause. Why
is that so?
The Court’s modern view of the Establishment Clause
was instituted sixty-two years ago with its decision in Everson
v. Board of Education of the Township of Ewing.79 Because both
the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses are pro-religious
freedom,80 the question arose early with respect to how the
two Clauses were to be distinguished. The Court’s answer
came soon in Engel v. Vitale81 and was reaﬃrmed a year later
in School District of Abington Township v. Schempp.82 As the
Engel Court said:
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Although these two clauses may in certain instances overlap, they
forbid two quite diﬀerent kinds of governmental encroachment
upon religious freedom. The Establishment Clause, unlike the
Free Exercise Clause, does not depend upon any showing of
direct governmental compulsion and is violated by the enactment
of laws which establish any oﬃcial religion whether those laws
operate directly to coerce nonobserving individuals or not.83

The Court goes on to explain that the reason that coercion is
not a required element of a no-establishment claim is that the
Clause is ﬁrst and foremost about the separation of church and
state.84 Church-state separation is a relationship between two
centers of authority. This is not due to any hostility to religion
but for the protection of both the freedom of the church and
to prevent division within the body politic when government
takes sides on explicitly religious questions. Disestablishment
deregulated religion, thus protecting both church and state.
Individual liberties are protected by the Establishment Clause
only as a consequence of keeping these two authorities in right
order relative to each other, and sometimes the individual
liberties protected are not religious, e.g., economic liberty, access
to public oﬃce, freedom of academic inquiry, etc.85
It thus developed in the Supreme Court that the Free
Exercise Clause was conﬁned to addressing those situations
where religious practice or observance had come under state
coercion. Without evidence of coercion, either standing was
denied (consider the discussion in Part II, supra, in Engel and
Schempp) or the free exercise claim failed on the merits.86 The
Free Exercise Clause is thus a rights-based claim; it runs in favor
of religious individuals and faith groups they form.87
The Establishment Clause operates quite diﬀerently—all
the while retaining its character as pro-religious freedom. The
Establishment Clause works to limit the power of government.
In that sense, it operates much like a structural clause.88 Many
an individual claimant need not show personal religious harm
to win a claim under the Establishment Clause.89 Indeed, in two
lines of cases the claimant does not need to show personalized
injury at all—taxpayer and “unwanted exposure” cases. This
came about because—unlike free exercise which is rightsbased—the Court’s modern Establishment Clause is about
separation of church and state. When church and state are
not rightly ordered, the harm or damage might be other than
religious. As this Court said in McGowan v. Maryland:90
If the purpose of the “establishment” clause was only to insure
protection for the “free exercise” of religion, then what we have
said above concerning appellants’ standing to raise the “free
exercise” contention would appear to be true here. However, the
writing of Madison, who was the First Amendment’s architect,
demonstrate that the establishment of a religion was equally feared
because of its tendencies to political tyranny and subversion of
civil authority.91

Such oppression often resulted in injury other than religious
harm (McGowan was economic), indeed it can result in
instances where no one has individualized injury and hence
no one has conventional standing to sue. This is called a
“generalized grievance.”92
In this regard, the modern Supreme Court’s work via
the Establishment Clause to keep rightly ordered church and
state causes the no-establishment principle to operate in many
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respects like the structural clauses of the Constitution which
separate the powers of the three federal branches. And just as
some violations of separation of powers can occur with no one
personally harmed, a “generalized grievance” can and does occur
where there is a colorable violation of the modern Establishment
Clause but no one with individualized harm. The ﬁrst such case
appeared before the Court in Flast v. Cohen,93 and the Court
responded by permitting limited federal taxpayer standing.
Stated diﬀerently, the surrogate of taxpayer as plaintiﬀ with
“injury in fact” permitted the Court to reach the merits of some
no-establishment claims that would otherwise be nonjusticiable
because no one had individuated injury to acquire standing.94
But as the plurality in Hein v. Freedom From Religion
Foundation, Inc., 95 recently said, Flast inadequately
acknowledged—even when limited as it was to claims under
the Establishment Clause—the distortion wrought to the
doctrine of separation of powers.96 So Flast, while still good
law, has not been expanded.
Flast is not the only line of cases where the modern Court
reduced the normal rigor of standing when it comes to the
Establishment Clause. The other line is where plaintiﬀs claim
injury due to “unwanted exposure” to religious speech but who
did not suﬀer the coercion or compulsion that would normally
be associated with the individualized injury required for
standing. Early on, as we saw in Part II, supra, the most common
case was public school students exposed to religion classes,
prayer, and biblical devotions, but the exercise was optional. The
Court’s response was to reduce the rigor of the required “injury
in fact” by stating that coercion was not an element of a claim
under the Establishment Clause. Like Flast, this necessarily
required a trade oﬀ. With respect to the Court’s co-ordinate
branches, reducing the rigor of standing was at the expense
of the doctrine of separation of powers. With respect to the
States, reduced rigor standing was at the expense of federalism.
In either instance, reducing the “injury” needed for standing
permitted the Court to reach the merits of an Establishment
Clause claim that would otherwise be outside the Court’s subject
matter jurisdiction. Like Flast, however, the reduction in the
rigor of normal standing requirements was narrow: only where
the oﬀended plaintiﬀ’s status naturally caused him or her to
personally come into “unwanted exposure” to the government’s
religious expression was standing permitted.
Buono’s status does not fit within the limits of the
Supreme Court’s narrow exception with respect to its “unwanted
exposure” cases. He has no responsibilities as a local citizen, such
as in McCreary County, to frequent the site at Sunrise Rock.
He holds no status as a student or student’s parent, such as in
McCollum or Schempp, which results in his presence at the site
of the Latin cross, nor is he a legislator needing to be present
in chambers to do his job as in Marsh. Assuming Buono has
paid the admission fee to enter the Mojave National Preserve,
certainly he has a legal right to be present at Sunrise Rock. But
his presence is entirely by his free and unrestrained choice.
Such a circumstance is no diﬀerent than a citizen of India,
who as a resident alien with a ﬁve-year visa to reside and work
in Massachusetts, takes a vacation to Southeast California
and pays the admission fee to enter the Mojave Preserve and
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happens to spot the Latin cross out of the windshield of his
automobile as he drives by Sunrise Rock. This is one of those
instances where if Buono has Article III standing to sue, then
the entire population of people within the jurisdiction of the
United States has standing to sue upon a single automobile ride
along Cima Road. None of the Court’s sixteen cases set out in
Part II, supra, is nearly so expansive.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court will have to expand its law with
respect to “unwanted exposure” cases to ﬁnd Frank Buono has
standing to sue. Just the opposite inclination was demonstrated
by the Roberts Court in Hein, and there is no obvious reason
that has changed. Hein reaﬃrmed federal taxpayer standing,
as originally announced in Flast, when the no-establishment
principle was at risk because of congressional appropriation
legislation. The plurality in Hein was right to do so. At the
same time the Hein plurality was correct to not expand taxpayer
standing into the myriad of discretionary decisions by oﬃcials
in the Executive Branch. Flast represented a tolerably small
compromise to separation of powers, in return for the Supreme
Court taking its rightful role as a co-equal branch with Congress
in the duty to police the boundary between church and state.
The plaintiﬀs in Hein, on the other hand, were asking for the
Court to toss overboard the doctrine of separation of powers.97
Frank Buono’s assertion of standing in this “unwanted exposure”
case is far more like the plaintiﬀs in Hein than in Flast.
Further, should the Supreme Court dismiss Frank Buono’s
complaint for lack of standing there will be no need to resolve
the merits of Buono’s diﬃcult no-establishment claim involving
prickly issues of congressional motive.98 Generally the Court
would welcome the opportunity to not extend itself and resolve
a diﬃcult constitutional question on the merits when the matter
can so sensibly be disposed of on jurisdictional grounds.
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